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Abstract  Mengzi maintained that both benevolence (ren 仁) and rightness (yi
義) are naturally-given in human nature. This view has occupied a dominant 
place in Confucian intellectual history. In Mencius 6A, Mengzi’s interlocutor, 
Gaozi, contests this view, arguing that rightness is determined by (doing what is 
fitting, in line with) external circumstances. I discuss here some passages from 
the excavated Guodian texts, which lend weight to Gaozi’s view. The texts reveal 
nuanced considerations of relational proximity and its limits, setting up 
requirements for moral action in scenarios where relational ties do not play a 
motivational role. I set out yi’s complexity in these discussions, highlighting its 
implications for (i) the nei-wai debate; (ii) the notion of yi as “rightness,” or 
doing the right thing; and (iii) how we can understand the connection between 
virtue and right action in these early Confucian debates. This material from the 
excavated texts not only provides new perspectives on a longstanding 
investigation of human nature and morality, it also challenges prevailing views 
on Warring States Confucian intellectual history.  
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In the well-known debate between Mengzi and Gaozi in Mencius 6A, Mengzi 
maintained that both ren and yi are naturally-given1 in human nature. The figure  
 
                                                             
1 To say that ren and yi are naturally-given is not to say that they are fully-developed from the 
start. I use the phrase “naturally-given” throughout the paper to indicate where a particular 
capacity or resource (ren or yi) may be found, rather than its final polished state. 
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Gaozi2 in the Mencius presents an opposing view, contending that ren is “inner” 
(nei 內) whereas yi is “outer” (wai 外). On the basis of this distinction (and 
other considerations in the text), it seems that Mengzi’s conception of yi is more 
appropriately described as “righteousness”—resembling the idea of moral 
conscience—whereas Gaozi’s yi is better understood as “rightness.” In the 
Mencius, Gaozi is not given space to elaborate on or justify his views. However, 
it seems that nuanced meanings of yi, resembling Gaozi’s nei-wai 
characterisation, are expressed in some of the texts in the Guodian collection. For 
example, yi is distinguished from genuine ( qing 情; or that which is genuine); yi 
is aligned with non-familial relationships and ren with familial ones; and yi is 
described as uncompromising (in contrast to ren, which is flexible and cohesive). 
I investigate yi’s complexity in these discussions by highlighting three 
observations. First, the Guodian material provides more support for Gaozi’s view 
of yi, allocating it to the “outer.”3 This points us to the likelihood that Gaozi’s 
view was more widely shared than its mention in the Mencius leads us to believe.  
For, in the Mencius, Gaozi’s views function primarily as a foil, and are used to 
establish the soundness of Mengzi’s views on human nature. Moreover, the 
Guodian documents articulate views not represented through the lenses of the 
Mencius’ authors, thus providing a less one-sided picture of the nei-wai debates 
among Mengzi and his contemporaries. Secondly, the Guodian characterisations 
of yi indicate that some of the pre-Qin thinkers were mindful of the limits of 
emotional attachment in moral motivation. It seems that some of these thinkers 
appealed to yi in cases where affection was deemed insufficient to motivate 
appropriate other-regarding action. Indeed, some of them viewed it necessary to 
apply yi in various domains of interaction, especially with non-specific others, as 
a counterbalance to ren, which operates in relationships with specific others, 
especially within the family domain. Finally, I reflect on how these 
                                                             
2 Little is known of Gaozi’s (ca. 420–350 BCE) background and associations. Kwong-Loi 
Shun discusses a number of theses regarding his philosophical affiliations (Shun 1997, 123ff.). 
Shun presents a detailed analysis of Mengzi's discussions with Gaozi (Shu 1997, 87–94).  
 Graham suggests that a more accurate reading of Gaozi’s position (as we know of Gaozi's 
views on human nature primarily via the description of his opponent, Mengzi) may also be 
gleaned from the “Jie” chapter of the Guanzi, a syncretic, Legalist compilation of positions 
from the late Warring States period through to the early Han (Graham 1967, 15–18). In its 26th 
chapter, “Jie” 戒, the point is made that “benevolence emerges from the centre, rightness is 
forged from the outside” (ren cong zhong chu, yi cong wai zuo 仁從中出，義從外作) (Trans. by 
author, from Guanzi, “Jie,” 1927, chapter 26). For a translation of the “Jie” chapter, refer to 
Rickett, 1985, vol. 1, 378–88). 
3 These manuscripts, believed to have been composed around the period of the Mencius and 
the Xunzi, were unearthed in 1993 from a tomb in Guodian, in Hubei Province. The 
manuscripts, dated to around 300 BCE, include versions of the Laozi (Allan and Williams 
2000) as well as previously unknown Confucian texts (Cook 2012). 
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considerations impact on our understanding of relational roles in Confucian 
philosophy. I suggest that the Guodian discussions are fascinating not least 
because they demonstrate levels of complexity in Warring States thought about 
the relevance and place of emotions in a person’s interactions with others. 
1  Mengzi and Gaozi 
In the Mencius, Mengzi and Gaozi disagree on a number of issues. Two of their 
disagreements are: (a) Is moral goodness a naturally-given aspect of human 
nature (and, if so, how) (Mencius 6A1–2)? (b) Is moral rightness (yi)4  a 
naturally-given aspect of human nature (Mencius 6A4)? In dealing with the first 
question, the dialogue draws two analogies. The first analogy, allegedly set up by 
Gaozi himself, is as follows: cups and bowls may be fashioned from willow 
though cups and bowls are not naturally-given in the willow’s existence. 
Analogously, both benevolence (ren) and moral rightness (yi) are what human 
beings develop into and are not inherent in human nature. In this argument, Gaozi 
and Mengzi share the view that ren and yi are constitutive of human goodness, 
even though they disagree about the source of each of them. Mengzi dismisses 
this analogy, noting that, if Gaozi were correct, we would need to violate human 
nature in order to shape it into what is morally pleasing, given that these features 
are not part of human nature to begin with. Mengzi says: 
Can you make it into cups and bowls by following the nature of the willow 
tree? Can you only make it into cups and bowls by violating and robbing the 
willow tree? If you must violate and rob the willow tree in order to make it 
into cups and bowls, must you also violate and rob people in order to make 
them benevolent and righteous? (Van Norden 2008, 143–44) 
孟子曰：“子能順杞柳之性而以為桮棬乎? 將戕賊杞柳而後以為桮棬也? 如將戕
賊杞柳而以為桮棬，則亦將戕賊人以為仁義與?” 
The Mencius then presents a second analogy to capture Gaozi’s view: human 
nature is like flowing water, which can be channelled east or west. Mengzi shows 
                                                             
4 Yi is often translated as “righteousness” or “duty.” Here, I use the word “rightness” for yi, 
which pertains to a sense of doing the right thing. We see in the conversation between Mengzi 
and Gaozi, for example, that yi applies to respect for an older person. For Gaozi, such respect 
pertains to any older person I happen to meet (that is, from circumstances), and does not arise 
from within the self. “Duty” helps to capture the deontological dimension of yi but “rightness” 
alludes to the notion of right in the clarification by W. D. Ross (2002), which also includes a 
sense of fit and appropriateness. 
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his dissatisfaction with this analogy by extending it. He claims that water has a 
tendency to flow downwards: 
Now, by striking water and making it leap up, you can cause it to go past your 
forehead. If you guide it by damming it, you can cause it to remain on a 
mountaintop. But is this the nature of water?! [No,] it is that way because of 
the circumstances. That humans can be caused to not be good is due to their 
natures also being like this. (Van Norden 2008, 144) 
今夫水，搏而躍之，可使過顙；激而行之，可使在山。是豈水之性哉?其勢則然
也。人之可使為不善，其性亦猶是也。 
Hence, even though human actions and decisions may be influenced by 
conditions external to the self—that is, like water that is channelled—they are 
naturally inclined towards goodness, and moral cultivation consists in 
developing these incipient tendencies. 5  This is a key tenet in Mengzi’s 
conception of human nature, one that applies universally to all humanity. 
As the conversation proceeds, Gaozi isolates various elements of human 
behaviour, attributing some aspects to human nature (xing 性 ), and then 
contrasting yi with ren: “Eating and sex are xing. Ren is internal, not external. Yi 
is external, not internal” (Nivison 1996, 153–56).6 When Mengzi questions him 
about the contrast between ren and yi, Gaozi replies with the case of how we are 
to respond to elders. Gaozi’s reply says, literally, 
This (he) is zhang thus I zhang this (him), (it is) not the case that zhang comes 
from within me (translated by author). 
曰：“彼長而我長之，非有長於我也。” 
Unpacking this meaningfully, Gaozi’s remark in the same passage may be 
interpreted as follows: 
He is (an) elder and thus I treat him as elder. It is not that elder arises from  
 
                                                             
5 Shun suggests that the Mencius might have misinterpreted Gaozi’s position: whereas Gaozi 
intends both the willow and water analogies to capture how ren and yi grow out of xing, 
Mengzi (mis)interprets Gaozi’s position. According to Shun, Mengzi understands the willow 
and the water as analogous to human beings, and holds the xing of the willow and the xing of 
the water as analogies for (human) xing. This mismatch in their conversation contributes to the 
tension in their views and has significant impact on how we understand their respective 
positions (Shun 1997, 87–91). 
6 告子曰：“食色，性也。仁，內也，非外也；義，外也，非內也。” 
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within me.7 
Gaozi locates the moral imperative—treating the elder as elder—as arising 
from a source external to the self, that is, from the age difference, not the 
relationship, between the elder and oneself. I interpret this to mean that respect 
for an elder is required simply because it is the right thing to do and not because 
the disposition or capacity or desire arises from within an individual.8 We 
presume that Gaozi presents the case of “elder” as an example of yi. If this is so, 
then yi might approximate to the idea of doing the right thing, whereby zhang is a 
case of doing the right thing by an elder—any elder one happens to meet. Yet, 
there is lack of clarity on a number of fronts. Is zhang just an example, or a 
paradigmatic instantiation, of yi? This question is important as we wonder whether, 
in Gaozi’s scheme, zhang is the only instance of doing the right thing, or whether 
there are other instances of yi. For example, is a person’s response to an official of a 
higher, or a lower, status also an example of yi? Clarity on these issues would enable 
a fuller understanding of yi. As we will see below, some of the Guodian passages 
provide more nuances on the nature of yi in the Warring States period. 
As the conversation continues in the Mencius, Mengzi asks specifically about 
the relation between yi and zhang, focusing on whether yi relates to action, or to 
agency: 
Moreover, do you say that to zhang is yi, or that he who zhang-s someone is yi? 
(trans. by author; see the translation by Nivison 1996, 157, following 
Graham). 
且謂長者義乎?長之者義乎?   
In other words, does the act of zhang constitute yi, or do we call the person who 
carries out zhang-acts, yi? Is zhang about (right) action or (virtuous) agency?  
                                                             
7 There are three occurrences of zhang in Gaozi’s response, all of them syntactically and 
semantically distinct. The first refers to “elder” in nominal form, as in “This is an elder.” The 
second zhang is a verb, capturing my interactions with the elder: “I treat (X) as elder.” The 
third is the most interesting use of zhang, and it could potentially be interpreted in two ways. 
First, Gaozi says, “It is not that zhang arises from (within) me.” Zhang may be understood as a 
predicate, as in “an older person.” Secondly and alternatively, zhang may be treated as a 
disposition (which would indicate Gaozi’s agreement with Mencius on this point). Whether as 
predicate or disposition, for Gaozi, neither arises from within himself. The moral force of 
zhang arises by virtue of the circumstances where, in this particular case, the other person just 
happens to be older than Gaozi. Even if zhang were interpreted as a disposition, it is one that 
arises in response to external circumstances (that is, encounter with any older person). From 
Gaozi’s point of view, this circumstantial feature nevertheless has normative implications. 
8 Gaozi in the Mencius does not fill out his picture of which elements of morality might arise 
from within him (yi wo 於我). I list these possibilities but they are not exhaustive.   
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The issue here for Mengzi concerns where the standard of yi, rightness, is located: 
the act, or the actor.9 In a passage elsewhere in the Mencius, Mengzi points out 
that the sage, Shun, acted from ren-yi; he did not (have to) bring his actions in 
line with ren-yi (Mencius 4B19).10 This passage suggests that the Mencius 
prioritises agency rather than action in the cases of both ren and yi. If we follow 
this line of reasoning, does Gaozi apply the agency-act distinction to ren and yi? 
That is, does he view ren as a moral notion applicable to agency, with yi applying 
to action? These questions about Mencius and Gaozi on action and agency are 
too complex to resolve in a determinate way here. However, Gaozi’s response to 
Mengzi below suggests that such a distinction is possible. Gaozi brings in 
another example, that of love for one’s brother, to demonstrate how zhang arises 
from a source external to the self. Gaozi says, 
This is my younger brother, hence I love him. [That is] the Qin person’s 
younger brother, hence it is not the case that I love him.  
It is from me that there is enjoyment (of loving my brother), therefore I say it 
is from the inside (nei).  
(With regard to) The elder from Chu, as well as the elder from (among) my 
people, it is from their (being) elder [or my treating them as elder] from which 
I derive pleasure. Therefore, I say this is from the outside (wai). (translated by 
author) 
曰：“吾弟則愛之，秦人之弟則不愛也， 
是以我為悅者也故謂之內。 
長楚人之長，亦長吾之長，是以長為悅者也，故謂之外也。” 
Gaozi appeals to feelings qua the source of his enjoyment (yue 悅), to answer 
Mengzi’s question. One way to understand Gaozi’s distinction between nei and 
wai is that, in the case of zhang (aligned with wai), there is no joy that springs 
from the person himself in carrying out these tasks or roles. Hence, the correct 
measure of rightness for treating an elder as an elder is determined by the 
circumstances, not least by the fact that the agent is younger than the recipient, 
and unrelated to him or her. In other words, Gaozi accepts that the term elder, 
zhang, denotes a relation between two people. However, he also emphasises that 
this relation is not a relationship but rather is circumstantial: no matter which 
elder, whether from my village or the next, I ought to treat him with respect due 
                                                             
9 In his translation of this passage in the Mencius, Nivison discusses this ambiguity in yi 
(Nivison 1996, 53). Refer also to Robert Eno’s articulation of this point, accessed at 
http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mengzi.pdf 
10 孟子曰：“…舜明於庶物，察於人倫，由仁義行，非行仁義也。” 
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to elders. In doing so, he appeals to standards that are not located within human 
nature, a point which the Mencius implicitly rejects by challenging Gaozi’s 
position. For Gaozi, the enjoyment in taking right action (in relation to 
yi-type actions) arises from an external source.11, 12 Here, in this discussion, 
we have a preliminary distinction of nei- and wai-type relationships made on 
the basis of (a) the nature of the relationship, and (b) the source of a person’s 
enjoyment in undertaking the task, or (in being) the type of person who 
undertakes such a task. 
The significance of the standoff between Gaozi and Mengzi extends beyond 
the debate in the Mencius: debates in the course of Chinese intellectual history 
have predominantly taken the side of Mengzi, especially in light of his views on 
human nature and its resources for moral goodness. Prior to the unearthed 
Guodian texts, the dominant view in scholarly literature was to take Gaozi’s view 
as an interesting but minority position.13 However, the texts reveal rich and 
                                                             
11 The conversation in the Mencius in fact continues, with two different actors, Meng Jizi (a 
disciple of Gaozi) and Gongduzi (Mengzi’s follower). Gongduzi defends Mengzi’s view that yi 
is internal, claiming that yi is (internally) motivated by a sense of respect (jing敬). Meng Jizi 
launches a counter-example to this scenario, arguing that one should serve wine first to a(n 
older) villager. That we should do so, he argues, draws not on respect but on zhang. That is, 
there must be something else, external, that requires one to serve the villager first (See Robert 
Eno http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mengzi.pdf)    
  As the debate continues, Gongduzi manages to manipulate Meng Jizi, ultimately getting him 
to agree that almost all human feelings, desires and preferences are “external.” Gongduzi says, 
“In winter we drink things hot, in summer we drink things cold; and so, on your principle, 
eating and drinking also depend on what is external!” Mengjizi’s view is that, ordinarily, 
standards may be subject to situational fluctuations. But, in doing so, he agrees to the 
suggestion that even jing is external: sure, respect may be determined by the timing or 
situation.  
  This leads to a problem then for the position held by Meng Jizi and Gaozi: What, then, is 
left “internally”? Recall that for Gaozi, ren is internal and yi external. This is effectively a 
reductio ad absurdum. 
  Yet, in fact, this impasse discredits not just Gaozi’s position. The conversation assumes that 
the brother deserves greater respect, but that the villager should be served first. However, the 
agreement seems to be driven by intuitions based on judgment on a case-by-case basis, an 
assumption that the Mencius needs to justify, but has not done so, hence begging the question 
about the original goodness of humanity.  
12 Kim-Chong Chong challenges the widely held view that this is the key difference between 
Mengzi and Gaozi on nei and wai. Chong argues that Mengzi did not succeed in refuting Gaozi, 
for Mengzi’s discussion on internality was focused on the human potential for developing the 
(positive) possibilities of relationships. By contrast, Gaozi sees the assumption of inherent 
human goodness as a “sociocultural construct” (Chong 2002, 120). 
13 This tendency unfortunately fails to locate the nei-wai debate more fully in its intellectual 
context. For example, Wang Bo notes that the Guanzi holds a view that aligns closely with that 
expressed by Gaozi (see note 2). The Mohist Canons (“Jing Xia” 经下, “Jing Shuo Xia” 经说
下) also cover the topic of ren-yi in relation to the nei-wai matter, even if its discussion is 
vague (2004, 29–34). 
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fascinating details on how the notion yi stands in relation to ren. Discussions in 
some of these texts draw out different ways in which particular moral standards 
apply within kinship domains and outside the family, particularly in 
consideration of whether there were blood ties. Some of these discussions touch 
on the limits of emotional attachment, proposing that yi, rightness, should apply 
where feelings for others do not have a role in moral motivation. We now turn to 
examine passages from some of these texts. 
2  Guodian Discussions of Yi 
The Guodian texts incorporate views that span the traditional 
Confucianist-Daoist divisions.  Additionally, they express previously unknown 
views, articulating nuances and fine distinctions while complicating existing 
debates on thinkers, lineages and extant texts. In relation to the understanding of 
yi discussed so far, some take the side of the view expressed by Mengzi: the 
Cheng Zhi 成之, for example, discusses how the cultivated person (junzi) looks 
within himself for moral resources.14 However, other texts in the collection 
express views that seem to be more closely aligned with those of Gaozi, and 
Mengzi’s other significant opponent on human nature, Xunzi.15 These latter 
views are the primary focus in this section.  
                                                             
14  The phrase “求諸己” (qiu zhu ji) is found in strips 7–18 of the Cheng zhi, as well as in 
Mencius 4A4 and Analects 15.21. Another Guodian text, the Wu xing, also holds that moral 
conduct ensues from benevolence (ren) which originates from “within”-a theme that is 
characteristically Mencian (Cook 2012, 469–78). 
  Strips 7–18: “Thus it is deeply that the noble man seeks it within himself. If one does not 
seek something in its roots but merely tackles it in its branches, he will not attain it” (Strips 
7–18, Cook 2012, 602–03; 615–21). 
  See also Strips 1–3: “Therefore, in establishing the people, the noble man goes before them, 
having first embraced goodness. He is conscientious and careful, abiding by wisdom; these are 
internal” (trans. by author). 
  (故)君子之立(蒞)民也，身(服)善以先之，敬(慎)以(守)知，其所(在)者內(矣). Another translation 
of this passage, by Scott Cook, reads as follows: “Thus in overseeing the people, the noble 
man presides before them having first submitted to goodness himself, and looks after them 
with diligence and conscientiousness; the locus of his [virtue] is internal” (Cook 2012, 
616–17). 
15 Although he drew on Confucian themes including yi, li (ritual) and zhi (knowledge, 
understanding), Xunzi opposed Mengzi on the issue of what was available for cultivating 
oneself. More closely aligned to the views of Gaozi (but yet noticeably different from the 
latter), Xunzi argued that the resources for moral cultivation lay outside of human nature, 
hence warranting socio-political institutions that could enhance human motivations and 
practices. 
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Xing Zi Ming Chu 性自命出 .  The Xing Zi Ming Chu makes a clear 
distinction between what is internal and what external (nei-wai), making the case 
that yi stands in contrast with what is genuine: 
Those who know (what is) genuine have the ability to bring them forth (from 
within); those who know yi have the ability to bring it within. (Strips 1–5, my 
translation) 
(知)(情)者能出之，(知)(義)者能內之。16 
The term qing情, translated “genuine” here, may also have the meaning of 
“feelings.” In the Warring States debates, both senses of the term may be 
conflated.17, 18 This has the effect of suggesting that feelings are a “genuine” or 
natural part of human nature. Interestingly, the Xing Zi Ming Chu holds the view 
that feelings are a genuine part of human nature; there are variations across the 
Guodian corpus concerning which emotions are constitutive of qing (Chen 2010, 
38–39). 
Whichever way we understand qing in this Xing Zi Ming Chu passage, yi 
stands in contrast to it. Unlike what is genuine, or unlike the case of feelings, yi 
has to be brought in from without. The emphasis on the ability (neng 能) of a 
person to bring yi within (nei) sits in contrast to the ability to bring forth what is 
genuine, or one’s feelings. These views on applying one’s abilities in order to 
shape the moral self in view of particular social, cultural and political aims carry 
the hallmarks of texts classified as “Confucian.” The Xing Zi Ming Chu 
discussions articulate, in particular, the implementation of external measures to 
further develop and “complete” human nature, providing details on what  
 
                                                             
16 Alternative translation: “Those who know the affections can bring it forth, while those who 
know propriety can instill it” (Cook 2002, 699–700). 
17 For example, in Mencius 6A6, qing provides the impetus for a person to practise what is 
good (shan 善). Here are two translations, the first that translates qing as “feeling,” and the 
second as “genuine.” 
“From the feelings [qing] proper to it, [human nature] is constituted for the practice of what 
is good” (Legge 1991, 402; annotations by author). “乃若其情，則可以為善矣，乃所謂善也。”  
If we understand qing as “genuine,” Mencius 6A.6 may be translated as: “As for what they 
are[,] inherently, they can become good. This is what I mean by calling their natures good” 
(Van Norden 2008, 149; annotation by author). 
18 Angus Graham explains the sense of qing as “genuine” in relation to Aristotle’s essence: 
“The qing of X is what makes it a genuine X, what every X has and without which would not 
be an X; in this usage qing is surprisingly close to the Aristotelian ‘essence’” (Graham 1967, 
262). Shun Kwong-Loi proposes an account of qing that is more sensitive to the Mencius as it 
avoids the appeal to Aristotelian essence. Shun proposes that qing is “the way things really are, 
[referring to] certain characteristic tendencies of a class of things that obtain of each individual 
member of that class and reveal what things of that class are really like” (Shun 1997, 215). 
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motivates, modifies and sharpens it.19   
In addition to the idea of yi being brought “within,” Strips 18–22 make an 
explicit connection between yi and ritual propriety (li), emphasising that, 
although they are grounded in feelings, the Latter operate on the basis of 
appropriateness: 
Propriety arises from (what is) genuine, yet it also elevates (what is) genuine. 
In undertaking matters, propriety is tailored according to what is proper for 
each occasion.  
As for the prioritising of first and last, this is the way of rightness. That which 
lends rhythm to this prioritising is refined patterning. (Author’s translation).20 
(禮)(作)於(情)，(又)(與)之也。(當)事因方而(制)之。  
其先後之(敘/序)，則(義)(道)也。或(敘/序)為之(節)，則(文)也。 
In these bamboo strips, a line is drawn between propriety and rightness and, 
together with what is expressed in Strips 1–5 (above), we see how yi, from 
                                                             
19 Other strips in the Xing Zi Ming Chu express the methods of cultivation in rich detail: 
“What moves [human] nature are [external] things. 
What runs contrary to human nature is pleasure (gratification). 
What tempers human nature is tradition. 
What sharpens human nature is yi. 
  Human nature is brought forth by skill/art; it is cultivated through practice, and it grows 
through (following/taking) [proper] ways” (Strips 10–12; author’s translation). 
反(動)(性)者, (物)也; (逆)(性)者, (悅)也; 室(砥/節)(性)者, (故)也; (礪)(性)者, (義)也; 出(性)者, (藝)
也; (養)(性)者, 習也;長(性)者, 道也。 
Alternative translation: “In general, [external] things are what motivate [human] nature, 
gratification is what receives human nature, traditions are what temper human nature, propriety 
is what sharpens human nature, cultivation is what brings human nature forth, practices are 
what nurture human nature, and [proper] ways (dao) are what give human nature growth” 
(Cook 2012, 705–06). 
  In this set of strips, the strategies for cultivating human nature, xing, are varied. The strips 
discuss details of what motivates, runs against and sharpens xing. Interestingly, in these 
passages, yi is used to shape xing. The idea that xing should be shaped sounds very similar to 
one element of Gaozi’s view, that is, that cultivation is analogous to shaping willow into cups 
and bowls (Mencius 6A1). Mengzi rebuts this view by pointing out that it sounds 
counter-intuitive to violate the nature (xing) of the willow in order to cultivate it. From this 
angle, the Xing Zi Ming Chu’s idea of using yi to shape xing could just as well be a target of 
Mengzi’s criticism of cultivation, (perhaps wrongly) conceived as the violation of one’s 
original nature (see the discussion in note 5). 
20 Alternative translation: “Ritual arises from the affections, but also elevates them. It is 
tailored in accordance with what is proper for each occasion. As for its prioritizing of first and 
last, this is the way of propriety. There is that which lends rhythm to this prioritizing, and this 
is refined patterning” (Cook 2012, 712–15). 
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without, plays an important role in human action. 21  However, unlike the 
conversation in the Mencius, the contrast in these strips is not between ren and yi 
but between li (propriety) and yi. Importantly, the passage here also espouses a 
Confucian aesthetic whereby right practice of ritual has an indispensable place in 
human relationality. 
Liu De 六德. The language in the Liu de is crisp, though seemingly simplistic 
in the way it characterises the distinction between ren and yi, in terms of the 
“internal” and the “external,” respectively: 
Ren is internal. Yi is external. Ritual and music are common to both. 
Internal positions are: father, son, husband. External positions are ruler, 
minister, wife.  
Within the gates, order is based on kindness holding check over yi. Outside the 
gates, order is based on yi censuring kindness. 
(The characteristic of) ren is gentle and cohesive; (the characteristic of) yi is 
firm and binding. 
Ren is flexible and receptive, yi is strong, uncompromising and 
straightforward.22 
(仁)，內也。(義)，外也。禮樂，共也。內(位)，父、子、夫也；外(位)，君、
臣、婦也。 
門內之(治)(恩)(弇)(義)，門外之(治)(義)斬(恩)。 
(仁)(類)(柔)而(束)，(義)(類)(持)而(絕)；(仁)(柔)而(納)，(義)強(剛)而(簡)。(Strips 
26–33; translated by author) 
Ren operates within domestic contexts, defined by the key relationships of father, 
son and husband. Selection of which role-relationships qualify as “inner” is 
based on socio-cultural norms and not strictly on blood ties. Lacking in parity is 
the role of wife (as contrasted with that of husband), which is characterised as 
“external.” Together with ruler and minister role-relationships, a man’s 
interactions with his wife are guided by yi. As the standard that holds for 
interactions with others “outside the gate,” yi is described as unyielding and 
straightforward. Although the positions of “husband” and “wife” may be 
                                                             
21 The prioritisation of first and last figures in a significant way in the conversation between 
Meng Jizi and Gongduzi, in their discussion of whom should be served wine first. Refer to the 
discussion in note 11. 
22 Alternative translation: “Humanity is [a matter of the] internal, propriety is [a matter of the] 
external, and ritual and music are [matters] in common [to both]. The internal positions are 
father, son and husband; the external positions are ruler, minister, and wife. 
  In the order within the [family] gates, goodwill holds check over propriety; in the order 
beyond the [family] gates, propriety cuts short goodwill. The manner of humanity is flexible 
and cohesive; the manner of propriety is steadfast and uncompromising. Humanity is flexible 
and harbors lenience; propriety is resolute and straightforward” (Cook 2012, 786–92). 
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understood in terms of role differentiation, the differential treatment 
recommended by ren and yi casts a poor light on Confucian patriarchalism. 
The ren-yi dichotomy in the Liu de is based not on motivational elements (for 
example, moral feelings toward particular others) as expressed in Gaozi’s view 
and in the Xing Zi Ming Chu. The lines are drawn here strictly on the basis of 
relational roles, using the metaphor of the gates to distinguish nei from wai. This 
move imbues particular relationships with moral content, which means that these 
relationships in themselves carry the grounds for appropriate action. We should 
note that the Mencius also sets out different relationships as the justification for 
different moral standards: “between father and son, there should be affection; 
between sovereign and minister, righteousness; between husband and wife, 
attention to their separate functions; between old and young, a proper order; and 
between friends, fidelity” (3A4; trans. Legge).23 In the final section, I will 
explore in greater detail how Mengzi draws the lines between different types of 
relationships. Suffice to note for now, however, that the Liu de specifically sets 
up mutual exclusivity between ren and yi, a view which is contrary to 
Mengzi’s.24 
Yucong 1 語叢一. Among the sections of the Guodian texts considered here, 
the Yucong is especially interesting as some of its phrases seem to align closely 
with views represented as Gaozi’s (in the Mencius).25 One of the phrases in 
Yucong 1 makes an explicit distinction between ren and yi: 
Ren is born from humanity, yi is born from dao. One is born from the internal, 
the other is born from without. (Strips 22–23) 
(仁)生於人, (義)生於道。或生於內, 或生於外。26 
While drawing a dichotomy between ren and yi, this statement is fairly consistent 
with the views expressed in the Xing zi ming chu and the Liu de. Yet, there is an 
important difference: Yucong 1, like the Mencius’ Gaozi, makes a distinction 
                                                             
23 父子有親, 君臣有義, 夫婦有別, 長幼有序, 朋友有信。 
24 Scott Cook suggests in light of these sentiments in the Liu de that Gaozi is a straw person 
for Mengzi. He argues that, in fact, the nei-wai distinction for Gaozi is specifically 
characterised by the blood ties elaborated on here, in the Liu de: “Nonetheless, it is also clear 
that Gaozi is serving here primarily as a straw man for Mengzi’s own arguments, and that-as 
Paul Goldin has noted-his true position on the statement that the latter attributes to him may 
very well have been much closer to, if not identical with, the type of distinction between internal 
and external relations discussed in ‘Liu de’” (Cook 2012, 761). See also Goldin 2000, 139. 
25 Paul Goldin proposes that some parts of the Guodian manuscripts, such as the Yucong, were 
written by those associated with Gaozi or who were sympathetic to his views (Goldin 2000, 
139). 
26 Alternative translation: “Humanity [ren] is born from mankind; propriety [yi] is born from 
the Way. One is born from within; the other is born from without” (Cook 2012, 825). 
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between ren and yi on the basis of nei-wai. On the other hand, however, it claims 
that yi arises from dao. This prompts us to ask the question: Are there two 
independent moral grounds, one arising from within humanity and the other from 
outside of it? Does the passage mean to suggest a “dao” independent of humanity? 
Also in this same text, we get in granular detail views of relational proximity 
among men: 
The father is both held close and honoured. Between brothers, there is a proper 
(way of) closeness. Friends, ruler and minister have no (such) closeness. 
(Strips 78, 80, 81) 
…父, (有)(親)又(有)(尊)。長弟, (親)道也。(友)君臣, (無)(親)也。27 
Relational bonds are distinguished on the basis of affection, that is, familial ties 
(qin 親) or the lack thereof. Recall that some of the relationships specified in the 
Liu de are the same as these: father and son as “internal” or “familial” and ruler 
and minister as “external” or “without familial bonds.” Here, too, friendship 
belongs “outside.” Yet, while the Liu de places the wife as “external” in contrast 
to the husband as “internal,” in the Yucong 1, relationships with or between 
females are conspicuously absent. 
Additionally, in the Yucong 1, there is a fascinating aspect of relational ties 
which is rare, or perhaps even not mentioned, in extant texts: 
Ruler and minister and friends are matters in which one can choose. (Strip 87) 
君臣、朋友, 其(擇)者也。28 
This statement, intriguingly, presents the notion of choice in certain relationships. A 
person may select his friends but, clearly, not his blood ties. Specific relational 
emotions undergird particular relationships and, furthermore, one cannot opt out of 
them. If we bring together the logic of these statements in the Yucong 1, do we arrive 
at a view of ren and yi as two distinct sources of moral justification, one grounded in 
humanity and the other in doctrine (dao)? And, may we align the relationships 
marked by familial affection (ones from which a person may not seek relief from) 
with ren, and non-familial relationships, with yi? Are we seeing the differentiation of 
relationships on the basis of (appropriate) feelings? Is the Yucong 1 recognising that 
there are limits to human feelings for specific others? Does this also mean that, for 
                                                             
27 Alternative translation: “… the father is both held close and honored. Elder and younger 
brothers [represent] the way of affinity (/closeness). Friends, ruler, and minister have no [such] 
affinity” (Cook 2012, 826). 
28 Alternative translation: “Ruler and minister and friends are matters in which one has a 
choice” (Cook 2012, 826). 
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the author(s) of Yucong 1, a view such as Mengzi’s, that the sources of morality are 
based entirely on what sprouts from within human nature, is too naïve? 
These sample passages from the Guodian texts present a varied picture of 
moral standards that apply inside and outside of specific relational contexts. A 
quick overview suggests that they are keenly aware of particular relationships 
based on some consideration of blood and familial ties or roles and their 
associated (moral) feelings. These considerations delineate appropriate feelings 
and actions according to relational proximity. Boundaries are drawn at 
relationships with particular others and, in the case of generalised relationships 
(with a superior or with an elder), a different standard, yi, from an external 
source, seems to be the guiding principle. What do these investigations amount to? 
In the final three sections of this paper, I consider the implications of these 
practicalities raised in some of the Guodian texts for (i) the Gaozi-Mengzi debate; 
(ii) the question of moral resources; and (iii) early Confucian debates on 
relationships and doing the right thing. 
3  Yi in the Guodian Passages, and the Gaozi-Mengzi Debate 
The debate between Gaozi and Mengzi highlights different views on ren and yi. 
Mengzi holds both as naturally-given in human nature, which for him also means 
that they both “arise” from within humanity. From the discussions in Mencius 2A6, 
it seems that, together with li (propriety) and zhi (understanding), both ren and yi 
have their sources in human nature (xing), even though they need to be developed 
through life. How do Gaozi’s views differ? Gaozi maintains a fundamental 
distinction between relationships that involve particular others (e.g. father, son) and 
those that involve non-specific others (e.g. elder). That standards for interactions 
with non-specific others do not necessarily fall within the ambit of close emotional 
ties seems to be a fairly popular view during the Warring States period (Chen 2017; 
Luo 1999).29 To some extent, the Mencius distinguishes between ren and yi but 
nevertheless maintains that they arise from the one source (see, for example, 7A15). 
For Gaozi and some of the Guodian authors, the moral standards or principles for 
relating to non-specific others are determined by circumstance (for example, 
whether this visitor happens to be an elder). The Guodian texts examined here stand 
with Gaozi, but they also provide glimpses into the complexity of nei-wai 
discussions during the Warring States period. They diversify the lines of argument in 
the Confucian debates on human nature. On one understanding of the Mengzi-Gaozi 
                                                             
29 The interpretation I offer here is different from that offered by Luo (1999). Luo argues that 
the Guodian discussions on ren-yi broaden our conceptions of the Confucian debate. The way 
this happens, Luo argues, is that we might now see ren and yi as working cooperatively with 
each other, with yi curtailing (cai duan 裁斷) ren where necessary (Luo 1999, 28). 
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debate, in the Mencius, Gaozi holds the defensive line, with his view serving 
primarily as the background against which Mengzi establishes his thesis. However, 
having seen that some of the Guodian texts align more closely with the views of 
Gaozi, could it be that Mencius 6A6 was holding a defensive position? Was the 
Mencius having to justify its minority position-that what springs from humanity is, 
with nurturing, sufficient for moral life? 
The nuanced views in the Guodian also yield a deeper understanding of what 
the Mencius might have meant by “yi” and why it was important for this 
Confucian text that both ren and yi are thought to be naturally-given. Here, it is 
important to note that the Mencius never characterises Mengzi’s own views in 
terms of “nei” and “wai.” Could this signify that the Mencius never saw its own 
view as being part of the nei-wai debate? And could it be that yi in the Mencius 
has a different meaning from yi in the Guodian sections? In contemporary 
discussions, yi in the Mencius has been interpreted in a number of ways, 
including as the motivation to do the right thing, or a person’s dispositions (in a 
general sense), or dispositions that are closely intertwined with (moral) 
knowledge, whereby knowledge of yi arises from the activity of the heart-mind 
(Shun 1997, 94–112). Given that Mengzi views yi as internal to humanity, the 
term “righteousness” perhaps aptly captures his idea of an “inner” moral sense, 
one that functions in the same way as conscience does. Correspondingly, the 
Gaozi-Guodian notion of yi as arising from a source “external” to the self may be 
more appropriately translated as “rightness.” To serve wine to an elder first—any 
elder—is, after all, the right thing to do. 
4  Wherein Do Our Moral Resources Lie? 
What is the significance of some of the observations in the previous section? As 
indicated, some contemporary research has focused in particular on the role of 
motivation in Mengzi’s philosophy as well as the place of the human heart-mind 
(xin) in the ongoing development of a person’s moral life. As I have also 
suggested, it is a common presupposition within the literature that the point of 
the Gaozi-Mengzi debate in the Mencius serves primarily to refine and reiterate 
Mengzi’s view that “human nature is (originally) good.” Consequently, the 
Gaozi-Mengzi debate is used to weigh in on discussions of classical Confucian 
views of human nature, addressing tensions between the Mencius’s position and 
Xunzi’s views on human nature. These debates often focus on the contrast 
between conceptions of human nature and their place within the Confucian 
intellectual tradition. However, the Guodian passages bring to light more that 
might have been at stake in the Warring States discussions among the Confucians, 
and between the Confucians and their opponents. 
The Guodian passages provide a sense that there were some shared 
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expectations about relational norms as well as attempts to set out criteria for 
appropriate interactions in different relationships. While the Mengzi-Xunzi 
disagreements might have ostensibly focused on the moral quality of human 
nature (xing), the Gaozi-Mengzi-Guodian discussions suggest that one primary 
concern that drove the debates was the issue of the moral resources that are, so to 
speak, to hand—naturally-given in human nature—and those that are not. For 
example, what kinds of affect might spring from the self (yu wo 於我)? Are these 
sufficient for motivating appropriate moral behaviours? Gaozi deems there are 
limitations to love (ai 愛) in that it does not extend to those with whom we are 
not intimately bound in familial relationships. The same is articulated in Yucong 
1, spelling out the domain within which familial affection (qin親) operates. 
Importantly, the Xing zi ming chu asserts that ren does not prioritise first and last 
(xian hou 先後), a task which rightly belongs to the domain of yi. Interestingly, 
yi also holds check over kindness (en 恩) in interactions “beyond the gate,” the 
Liu de informs us. These delineations are important because they tell us where 
we might look for motivational emotions, and for standards for proper behaviours, 
in our interactions with others. Indeed, with these views to enrich our 
understanding of the Gaozi-Mengzi debate, we begin to see that the early 
Confucian discussions transcended mere quibbles about “original” human 
nature.30 We begin to see pieces of a more meaningful conversation among 
thinkers of the time, that effectively amounted to an “enquiry into ethical 
resources” (Heng 2002, 158) and where to find them.31 
                                                             
30 Luo Xinhui proposes that the Guodian ren-yi discussions should be understood as part of a 
Confucian discourse, beginning with the Confucian Analects (which placed almost exclusive 
emphasis on ren in contrast to its emphasis on yi), the Mencius (which gave place to both ren 
and yi but which prioritised the former), and the Guodian and other Warring States texts such 
as the Mozi, which opened up the discussion further about ren and yi, giving each its own place 
in moral life (1999). 
31 In Mencius 2A2, Mengzi says of Gaozi’s views: 
  Gaozi said “What you do not get from doctrines do not seek for in your heart. What you do   
not get from your heart, do not seek for in the qi.”  
  To which Mengzi replied: 
  “What you do not get from your heart, do not seek for in the qi,” is acceptable. “What you 
do not get from doctrines, do not seek for in your heart,” is unacceptable (Mencius 2A2; Van 
Norden 2008, 37). 
  There are two related assertions in this statement concerning sources of moral guidance. The 
first claims that if guidance cannot be found in doctrines, it likewise cannot be found “within” 
human nature (or within any of its “given” capacities). The second states that if guidance is not 
found in the heart-mind, it will not be found in qi (vitality, energies) either. Mengzi disagrees 
with the first claim. For Mengzi, guidance can be found in the original, naturally-given 
heart-mind. However, he agrees with the second assertion because he holds that the heart-mind 
should nurture and command qi. Alan Chan offers a fine account of qi in different texts of a 
contemporaneous period. Qi in the Mencius includes both mental and physical well-being. 
One’s words and eyes reflect one’s qi and a person’s environment can shape his or her qi. The 
place of qi in Mengzi’s philosophy and the nuances of different interpretations of this view are 
meticulously spelt out in Chan 2002, esp. 50–55. 
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The Guodian classifications draw from lived experience and are unwieldy.  
They use a range of criteria for drawing distinctions: moral feelings and their 
functions, and relational proximity and blood ties more specifically, as well as 
role-based morality. We see no evidence of moral principles being drawn but, 
rather, discussions about the criteria that could inform moral principles. Yet, 
even with the small sample of views examined in this paper, we are now more 
attuned to the importance of the nei-wai debate about what kinds of moral 
resources are available to us, and how they are available to us (i.e. what kinds of 
emotions motivate appropriate behaviour toward particular others and whether 
they might need to be kept in check in interactions with non-specific others, for 
example). 
5  Relationships, Roles, and Doing the Right Thing 
Gaozi and the Guodian’s authors might be right that there are different sources of 
motivation, and different standards, to guide our interactions with manifold 
others. Perhaps, in thinking empirically, they have demonstrated to a certain 
extent that the Mencius is too naïve in assuming that humanity—each individual 
human being—is him-or herself a sufficient source of moral goodness, waiting to 
be nurtured. What is the picture we have so far, of these particularities? The 
Guodian sections articulate varied meanings of yi— rightness rather than 
righteousness—defined on the basis of: fitting responses to others (e.g. zhang); 
role-determined interactions (e.g. minister, friends); and discretion in 
domain-based interactions (e.g. straightforwardness vs flexibility). As noted 
previously, these discussions reveal their views on the limits of affection as 
sources of moral motivation. In the Guodian, in those non-specific relationships 
where affection is not applicable, moral obligation must be justified on other, 
non-self-generated grounds. On the one hand, like these texts, the Mencius 
recognises that different affect and proprieties hold sway over different relational 
bonds (Mencius 2B2, 3A4). On the other hand, it diverges from these Guodian 
passages we have seen, in its affirmation that the sources of morality are, at least 
initially, from within the human person. For Mengzi, these endowed moral 
resources are sufficient, meaning that each person needs look no further to 
develop morally. By contrast, Gaozi and others are not convinced that what is 
genuine and given, even if they are altruistic and other-regarding, are adequate 
sources of moral motivation. For Gaozi, when one encounters an elder, it is the 
fact of the elder that serves as the standard for moral action. The idea of wai—
external—has two important meanings here. First, doing the right thing by the 
elder does not derive from personal pleasure or delight. It does not arise from 
within the self. Secondly, the obligatoriness of zhang in treating an elder is 
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justified by the circumstances external to the self, in terms of a relationship 
between any two people, one younger in age than the other. 
Additionally, the Liu de’s specification of being uncompromising and 
straightforward in interactions outside the (family) gates is particularly striking, 
as is the Yucong 1’s mention of choice in relationships. Do these debates not also 
imply a distinction between relational roles, on the one hand (as the Confucians 
viewed them), and right action, on the other? The explicit mention of choice in 
the Yucong 1 reminds us of the inescapability of how a self is defined through 
particular relationships, even though it might be possible to sever dysfunctional 
relational ties later on in life. 
How do the issues raised here impact on two key questions in morality, “How 
should I live?” and “What ought I to do?” In contemporary discussions in Virtue 
Ethics, these two questions can direct our gaze in quite different, and sometimes 
incompatible, directions. Sometimes, good people do the wrong thing and bad 
people do the right thing, prompting us to ask, in the context of virtue ethics, 
whether virtue can reliably motivate right action. It seems that a similar question 
arises in the Mengzi-Confucian conception of ethical life and ethical action: the 
question “How should I live?” in Confucian philosophy is intimately intertwined 
with the quality of close personal relationships a person has and how these 
ultimately play into a flourishing life. The Mencius, in particular, has sometimes 
been understood as suggesting that ethical action follows straightforwardly from 
how a person conducts his life in handling personal relationships (Mencius 
1A7).32 In the discussion here, we have encountered some views that stand in 
contrast to this. Gaozi and some Guodian authors are concerned that the 
resources and standards required for close personal interactions will not suffice 
for relationships that primarily have a different structure. They recognise that ren, 
a central aspect of close personal relationships, cannot reliably produce right 
action when relating to non-specific others. Are these thinkers correct in situating 
at least some moral standards, or resources, external to the self? Perhaps they 
were more realistic than Mengzi, the paradigmatic Confucian virtue ethicist. 
The investigations in this paper raise more questions about the Warring States 
interchanges than they can possibly resolve—and there is even more to explore 
in the Guodian. Nevertheless, these reflections have important implications for 
the Confucian notion of selfhood and morality in comparative philosophical 
debates, especially for those who seek to defend virtue-ethical accounts of a good 
life and the place of right action within it. It seems that the Guodian thinkers and 
Gaozi were less optimistic about human motivations and about affect, in 
particular, as a general source of moral motivation, than Mengzi was. As such, 
they seem to have hedged their bets both ways, relying partly on emotion and 
                                                             
32 For discussions on this issue, refer to Wong 2002, Hutton 2002, and McRae 2011. 
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partly on right action. If we accept this, we would have a more complicated (and 
more sophisticated) Warring States account of moral life than what we have seen 
to date in the extant texts. 
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